The implications of credit derivatives regulations in the EU by Lopez-Mellado, Maria
Institute of Advanced Legal Studies 
School of Advanced Study 
University of London 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Maria Lopez-Mellado 
 
The Implications of credit derivatives regulations in the 
EU 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LLM 2009-2010 
International Corporate Governance, Financial Regulation and 
Economic Law (ICGFREL) 
1 
 
R6702 ICGFREL 
 
The implications of credit derivatives regulations in the EU 
Abstract 
Over the last two years, the international financial markets have experienced severe 
disruptions caused by different factors that have been already analysed by regulators 
worldwide. There has been however a factor of general discussion regarding the impact that 
credit derivatives have had in transferring and diversifying risk within the global financial 
market. As a consequence, regulators are now trying to reach a set of proposals that would 
help in avoiding any future disruptions caused by the use of these financial instruments.  
The main focus of this paper is on the analysis of the new regulatory proposals on 
counterparty credit risk for credit derivatives in the EU and the main challenges that market 
participants will have to face after these regulations are implemented.  
In order to better understand the role that credit derivatives have played in the current 
financial crisis, this paper will be divided in three main parts, all of them correlated. That is, 
the first part focuses on the definition of different credit derivatives, market size and market 
participants for these types of instruments. 
The second part of the paper addresses the main proposals by Basel Committee that will 
affect counterparty risk on credit derivatives, subsequently and as a reflexion of these 
changes I will focus on how the Credit Requirements Directive will implement the Basel 
proposals as part of the EU legislative framework and its implications. Due to the extension 
of the topic, this paper will only cover Public Law issues. 
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Finally, the paper expresses a personal opinion on how the new regulatory framework could 
constitute a big challenge for market participants that for the last decade have been motivated 
on the use of credit derivatives to transfer risk, a less regulated market.  
Part I:  
1.1 Credit Derivatives and the Markets 
Credit derivatives have played a very important role in the financial markets for the last 
twenty years. Since the first transactions made in the early 90’s, the market has grown 
significantly and very rapidly on the use of these types of financial instruments1. According 
to a survey made by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association, (ISDA) on the 
results of mid-year 2008 of privately negotiated derivatives, the notional amount outstanding 
of credit derivatives decreased by 12 percent in the first six months of the year to $54.6 
trillion from $62.2 trillion. However, the annual growth for credit derivatives was 20 percent 
from $45.5 trillion at mid-year 20072. With the introduction of credit derivatives into the 
financial markets, there has been a dramatic change in the process of credit intermediation as 
well as important improvements in the management of risk. Through these new instruments 
the distribution of risk out of the banking system was easier and allowed market players to 
spread risk more widely. The non sole participation of financial institutions but also the 
diversification to non financial institutions on the use of these securities as well as the 
                                                            
1 The 2007 BIS survey points out that the rapid growth has been also due to the “newest of these instruments” 
the survey explains that “positions in credit derivatives stood at $51 trillion at end-June 2007, compared to $4.5 
trillion in the 2004 survey”. Triennial Central Bank Survey of Foreign Exchange and Derivatives Market 
Activity in 2007 Final results, December 2007 http://www.bis.org/publ/rpfxf07t.htm 
 
2 “This decrease primarily reflects the industry's efforts to reduce risk by tearing up economically offsetting 
transactions, and demonstrates the industry's ongoing commitment to reduce risk and enhance operational 
efficiency”. ISDA Mid-Year 2008 Market Survey http://www.isda.org/press/press041608market.html 
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facilities for buying and selling protection created a new concept on the way risk was being 
managed3. 
Furthermore, the incredible high returns (the higher the risk, the higher the return) and the 
benefits of these securities created in the markets an enormous diversification of risk that 
ended up with the first signs of decline in 20074. Unexpectedly, for many market players, 
credit derivatives were one of the causes of the major systemic risks occurred in the financial 
markets since the Great Depression. As Warren Buffett once called them, “credit derivatives 
are weapons of mass destruction”5. 
As a consequence of the credit crisis, regulators are trying to find the appropriate regulatory 
framework for these types of securities and numerous possible changes are being discussed 
globally. In the US, it has been approved, the new financial reform bill by the US Congress in 
early July 20106. In order to understand these changes, this paper briefly discusses the 
development of credit derivatives as new and more complex financial products and the use of 
                                                            
3 The innovation of these financial instruments permitted access to them by not only financial institutions but 
also private offerings, institutional investors such as insurance companies, pension’s funds, state and corporate 
investments funds etc. The range of market participants was therefore wider than with any other securities in the 
capital markets. 
 
4 On a Speech made By the Vice president of the ECB Lucas Papademos in 2006 he pointed out the benefits of 
credit derivatives by saying “credit derivatives have effectively helped to enhance the efficiency of the financial 
system by (I) providing to both bank and non-bank financial institutions access to a broader range of risk-return 
combinations and a wider pool of underlying risks, and (ii) enhancing the liquidity of corporate bond markets. 
Finally, the rapid growth of CRT instruments in Europe also points to a more integrated market for credit risk, 
and may reflect the market response to the persistent segmentation of the underlying cash market due to national 
regulatory barriers, legal difficulties to transfer loads, etc. In other words, the CRT market is a good example of 
an effective private-sector impetus to deepen financial integration in Europe”. However, on the same speech the 
Vice President also refers to the “caution” on the creation of new risks as it could affect the financial markets 
stability. It was not however predicted at the type the serious consequences of the past years exceed on the use 
of these instruments. http://www.ecb.de/press/key/date/2006/html/sp060629_2.en.html 
 
5 In 2003, on the annual letter to shareholders, Warren Buffet warned investors by saying that “The rapidly 
growing trade in derivatives poses a “mega-catastrophic risk” for the economy and most shares are still “too 
expensive”. 
 
6 “The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, named after Senate Banking Committee 
Chairman Christopher Dodd, D-Conn., and House Financial Services Committee Chairman Barney Frank, D-
Mass., contains provisions requiring that many over-the-counter derivatives and swaps be traded and cleared on 
regulated exchanges, giving shareholders a non-binding say on the pay of high-ranking corporate executives, 
and restricting the proprietary trading of banks in derivatives with their own capital”. 
http://www.opencongress.org/bill/111-h4173/show 
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credit derivatives in structured finance. The main focus of the paper is however on the 
analysis of pre credit crisis regulations and the challenges of the proposed new regulatory 
framework in the European Union as well as the possible implications for the financial 
markets. This Paper will focus mainly on Public Law issues relating to credit derivatives, as 
being discussed by Basel Committee for Clearing Counterparty Houses (CCP), regulatory 
capital requirements and risk management techniques. However, in order to understand these 
new changes, the paper starts from a history and overview on the different credit derivatives. 
1.2 History and development of credit derivatives 
Definition of credit derivatives and the growth of credit derivatives market 
There is no universally accepted definition for credit derivatives, however a possible 
definition as stated by Paul Harding would be: Credit derivatives are customized contracts 
between two parties under which one party agrees to make a payment to the other party if a 
credit event occurs or there is a change in a credit spread7. Thus, in a credit derivatives 
contract, the seller of protection agrees to pay the buyer of protection an amount if during the 
period agreed in the contract a credit event occurs that could affect either the obligation or the 
reference entity established in the contract. In return, the buyer pays periodically a fee to the 
buyer. As an attempt to standardise these events definitions for the market industry, the 
International Swaps and Derivatives Association first defined these possible “events” by 
including “six credit events” in 1999. The definitions include as a credit event: “Bankruptcy, 
obligation acceleration, obligation default, failure to pay, repudiation/moratorium and 
restructuring”8. The 1999 ISDA definitions are standard industry terms which are usually 
                                                            
7 Definition by Paul C Harding  “Mastering the ISDA Master Agreements (1992 and 2002)”, FT Prentice Hall, 
Financial times, Great Britain 2004 
 
8 Section 5 of ISDA Master agreements defines each individual “ event default”, currently amended by ISDA 
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incorporated by contracting parties in their swap agreements and these were later amended by 
the 2003 ISDA credit definitions9. 
Therefore, if any of the mentioned credit event occurs, the seller of protection would either 
pay an amount equal to the loss in value of the reference obligation to the buyer so that the 
transaction will be cash settled or if the seller of protection pays instead the difference of the 
value but does not take over the obligation, then the transaction would be physically settled10. 
As previously mentioned, since the first credit derivatives transaction made in New York in 
1992 the market has grown very rapidly reaching approximately and outstanding notional of 
$62 trillion in 2007 as the Triennial Central Bank Survey of Foreign Exchange and 
Derivatives Market Activity shows11. The reason of the rapid increase was because of the 
benefits that this new instruments offered. Thus, credit derivatives allow investors to hedge 
the potential risk that borrowers might fail to repay their outstanding debts and it also allows 
banks to hedge their risk and without the need to transfer the underlying bond or loan. This 
feature was especially attractive to investors12. 
Credit derivatives have been used by different market players and its expansion has gone 
from financial institutions to non financial institutions. Some of the major market players 
                                                            
9 http://www.isda.org/publications/intro/2003cdd-2.pdf. 
10 Section 2 of the ISDA Master agreements 2002 establishes different ways by which a non defaulting party 
could choose their payments obligations. However the ISDA Agreement is not just a simple set of general rules, 
thus, the agreement as defines in the preamble “deems that in each confirmation in a transaction, are part of a 
single agreement. Therefore, in an event of default (as defined by section 5) occurs, all the outstanding 
transactions are terminated and valued and a single amount will become payable by one party to the other that 
would be equal to the net value of the terminated transaction. (Section 14 of ISDA master agreements) 
 
11 Bank of international Settlement, December 2007:  Triennial Central Bank Survey of Foreign Exchange and 
Derivatives Market Activity in 2007. http://www.bis.org/publ/rpfxf07t.htm 
12 ISDA on a report on  for the “Proposals for the regulation of credit derivatives comments of the international 
swaps and derivatives association” already pointed out on the benefits of credit derivatives by staying “that the 
benefits of credit derivatives extend not only to the full range of exposures arising from commercial banking but 
also to exposures from trading activities. Credit derivatives may, for example, be used to hedge a concentrated 
position in an issuer's bonds or securities. Similarly, an institution could protect itself against default from a 
current net mark-to-market counterparty exposure in its swaps portfolio by entering into a credit derivative 
transaction” 
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include commercial and investment banks, manufacturing companies, investors in project 
finance deals, institutional investors and also employees worried about the safety of their 
bonuses. 
The use of these instruments had therefore numerous benefits for a wide spectrum of different 
market players. Thus, some of these benefits that have contributed to the development of the 
credit derivatives market imply micro and macro economic benefits. Macroeconomic benefits 
include the fact that credit derivatives diffuse credit risks across markets and help to reduce 
risk concentration by transferring such risks to other market players that are capable of 
absorbing those risks. On the other hand, on a micro economic level, credit derivatives enable 
lenders and investors to better manage credit risks being able to take or to transfer the risks 
they do not want to hold. This use has also contributed not only to mitigate and to manage 
risk but also to be able to price and benchmark credit risk from other market’s risks. They 
have also improved the market’s intermediation by creating liquidity in the markets13. 
In contrast with the mentioned benefits, there are also some risks that the uses of these 
instruments carry with them. Credit derivatives’ availability to manage risk depends on 
markets staying relatively liquid even in periods of stress. As the markets become less 
illiquid, market participants are not able to absorb or even to transfer those risks. There is also 
a potential risk that credit derivatives could not be managed and understood appropriately due 
to the high complexity of these products. Furthermore, the diffusion of credit risk outside of 
traditional banking institutions makes it more difficult to oversee and supervise14.  
                                                            
13 Benefits and market players of credit derivatives as stated by Dominic O’Kane on “ Credit derivatives 
Explained”, Structured Credit research, March 2001, Lehman Brothers International 
 
14 De Larosiere on his report to the European Commission relates to the risks associated with Credit derivatives 
structures. De Larosiere report, Brussels, 25 February 2009 
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These factors if not properly managed could indeed end up creating a systemic risk for the 
global financial markets and its stability15.  
There are three main types of credit derivatives and these will include, credit default swaps, 
credit options and total return swaps. 
1.3 Types and structures of credit derivatives16: 
Credit Default Swaps  
A credit default Swap is a financial contract in which the protection buyer pays a 
periodic fee, (normally paid on the notional amount in basis points per annum) in return of a 
contingent payment by the protection seller if a credit event occurs with respect to a reference 
entity17. As a bilateral contract, the definitions of a credit event, obligations and settlement 
that will determine the contingent payment are determined by the parties involved in the 
transaction. However, ISDA included in 1999 some definitions and standards in order to 
create these type of contracts18. The reason was to try to further standardise and also to 
provide more clarity to the terms to be included by the parties involved in these types of 
transactions. The 2003 ISDA Master agreements are now the common model being use by 
investors. 
                                                            
15 As Lord Turner stated  “It is therefore possible that the growth of the securitised credit intermediation model 
has increased systemic risk in ways which are not just the result of poor execution – bad remuneration policies, 
inadequate risk management or disclosure, failures in the credit rating process – but inherent” The Turner 
Review: A regulatory response to the global banking crisis. March 2009 
 
16  For further information see “Credit derivatives explained” by Dominic O’Kane March 2007, Structured 
credit research. 
 
17 http://www.isdacdsmarketplace.com/about_cds_market 
 
18 The 1999 ISDA agreement was later amended by the 2003 credit definitions by ISDA. “The new definitions 
include: A new test for identifying the Successor to a Reference Entity; Amendments to various Credit Events, 
including Bankruptcy, Repudiation/Moratorium and Restructuring; Alternative Procedures for non-deliverable 
bonds and loans: guarantees; and novation provisions”. 
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A CDS is often described as being similar to an investment policy in the sense that the 
protection seller receives a fee for agreeing to compensate the buyer is a post event occurs. 
However, the credit event is not dependant of any action from the buyer in this case and for 
this reason a credit derivative can be traded when they have been contractually established on 
standardised terms by the relevant counterparties19. The protection buyer can at the same time 
transfer the risk that might derive from a different exposure.  
Most of the credit derivatives transactions are agreed over the counter (OTC) and in contrast 
with exchange traded securities, these contracts, will depend upon the agreement between the 
parties (bilateral agreement). This feature and the nature of the contracts between the parties 
is important as different regulatory requirements would apply to them. This paper will discuss 
later the new regulatory requirements being discussed by EU regulators for exchange traded 
and OTC derivatives.  
In the vast majority of transactions, market participants follow the 1999 and post 2003 ISDA 
Credit derivatives definitions for OTC transactions. The following are the most common 
elements to be included in the contracts: 
1. - The parties need to agree on the reference entity20, notional value and maturity of the 
transaction and the premium to be paid. Credit default swaps and all the derivatives are 
mainly sophisticated and it does not retail transactions where the average notional value of 
the transaction is not below $25. Reference entities normally include sovereign, financial 
                                                            
19 There have been many discussions in relation to the similarities on insurance contract and credit derivatives. 
However both contractual transactions are very different. On a paper issued by the Bank of England in 
November 1996 although mainly related to capital adequacy on these products, there was also time for 
discussion in the differences by insurance contracts and derivatives. “Developing a Supervisory approach to 
Credit Derivatives” 
 
20 As defined by Section 2.1 of the Credit Definitions 
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institutions and other investment grade institutions. The maturity parameters are normally 
between 5 to 10 years depending on liquidity and rating of the CDS21. 
2. - The definition of a credit event: thus, the occurrence of one o more of the following 
events; Failure of payment of an obligation, bankruptcy, repudiation, obligation default, 
restructuring22. 
3. - Settlement as to whether it will be physical or cash settlement23. 
4.- The parties should also establish which of the debt obligations of the reference entity may 
be delivered to the seller in case of physical settlement or value if cash settlement. The 
contingent payment is calculated as the fall in price of the reference obligation and its market 
value following the event. The parties can also agree a fixed cash settlement also know a 
binary settlement24. 
CDS are by far the most common used credit derivatives and they are also the most common 
used to help building credit derivative structures such as CDO, collateral debt obligations25. 
                                                            
21 Conditions for payment contained in Article III of the Credit Definitions 
 
22“Consolidation of the 2003 ISDA Credit Derivatives Definitions , the 2009 ISDA Credit Derivatives 
Determinations Committees, Auction Settlement and Restructuring Supplement to the 2003 ISDA Credit 
Derivatives Definitions, published on July 14, 2009  and the May 2003 Supplement to the 2003 ISDA Credit 
Derivatives Definitions available from www.isda.org 
 
23 Cash settlement is defined on Section 8.1 of the ISDA credit Definitions 
 
24 For further Cash or physical settlement the Credit definitions covers these features on Section 7.1 for cash 
settlement and sections 8.1 for physical settlement as well as Section 3.4 for Notice of Intended Physical 
settlement. 
 
25 On a survey conducted by Moody’s in May 2008 about CDS: Market, systemic and Individual risk in 
perspective, the agency concluded that “the main systemic risk posed by CDS market was not its large size but 
rather the consequences of a possible default by a major dealer”. Months later and very unexpectedly, there was 
a later publication after the aftermath of Lehman bankruptcy in September of the same year. 
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By analysing the most common features of CDS contracts will help us to later understand as 
well the capital requirements and central counterparty proposals in order to better manage the 
risk involved on these types of transactions.  
Portfolio transactions (SPV or Special purpose vehicle) 
Credit default swaps can also be used in a portfolio to create new instruments with risk and 
return features for specific market players. The use of CDS to construct a portfolio is part of 
the market in collateralised debt obligation or CDO. These types of transactions are structures 
and as such they do not have standardised features as CDS. However, CDOs can be 
distinguished for certain characteristics. CDO as a debt security issued by an SPV and backed 
by a diversified loan or bond differs from any other structured products because cashflows on 
a diversified portfolio have a lower variance than individual ones and therefore the lower the 
risk is the lower yield a portfolio can be issued26. 
The protection buyer can also enter into a portfolio CDS referenced to a portfolio of 
companies rather than a single name directly with the seller. This is called a credit linked note 
(CLN) by avoiding the use of the SPV27. By entering directly into a portfolio of CDS’s 
implies however a counterparty risk and if the protection buyer is a bank, it will obtain the 
lower capital requirements only if the protection seller is also a bank28. 
                                                            
26 Financial Stability review report: June 2001 “The credit derivative markets and its development and possible 
implications for financial stability”. David Rule, G10 Financial Surveillance Division, Bank of England 
 
27The JP Morgan Guide to Credit Derivatives Also for further information of CDO and SPV see “Credit 
derivatives explained” by Dominic O’Kane March 2007, structured credit research. 
 
28 For further information and specific requirements for CLN as well as different types of repackaging please see 
Credit derivatives and credit Linked Notes, 2nd Edition, Satyajit Das, John Wiley & Sons 2000 
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On a CDO structure, the risk of the portfolio is normally divided into a minimum of three 
tranches. Current market practice tranches the risk in the way that a senior position is AAA 
rated and mezzanine and equity will be either BBB or below29. 
Commercial banks can also use CDO structures to transfer the credit risk on loans that they 
have originated. These structures are also known as collateralised loan obligations or CLOs. 
The aim of these transactions is to transfer the risk out of the bank’s balance sheet. 
CDOs can be also used for “arbitrage transactions”30. The purpose of these types of 
transactions is to repackage portfolios of illiquid or high yield securities that have been 
bought in the secondary markets. 
Total return Swaps 
A total return swap is also a bilateral financial contract designed to transfer risk between the 
parties31. However, in contrast with credit default swaps, this contract exchanges the total 
economic performance of a specific asset for another cash flow. The payments between the 
parties are based on changes in market value of a specific credit instrument and it is 
irrespective whether a credit event has occurred or not. Therefore, the buyer of protection 
agrees with the seller of protection that during the prescribed period, he will pay amounts 
equal to the principal or interest on the bonds if and when received32. The real effect would 
be as if the seller was holding the bonds as he has the risks in the value of the bonds 
                                                            
29 Rating of structure products by credit rating agencies become very popular as investors were relying on the 
ratings in order to assess the default risk associated to the individual tranches.  
 
30 A detailed definition for arbitrage transactions see JP Morgan research for credit derivatives in collaboration 
with risk metrics and also credit derivatives and credit Linked Notes, 2nd Edition, Satyajit Das, John Wiley & 
Sons 2000 
 
31For further discussion of Total return Swaps, see Credit derivatives and credit Linked Notes, 2nd Edition, 
Satyajit Das, John Wiley & Sons 2000, p10 
 
32 The total return language was first included on the 1996 ISDA equity Derivatives definitions. Section 7.1 and 
it is equally possible to apply the same formula to Credit derivatives 
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(reference obligation). The total return of the reference obligation in this case comprises the 
sum of interest, fees and any changes on value33. At the same time, the changes on value of 
payment will be equal to any appreciation or depreciation in the market value of the reference 
obligation. Payments on change in value are normally made at maturity or on a periodic 
interim basis in as an alternative of cash settlement. In return, the seller of protection or the 
receiver makes payments of LIBOR plus a spread34. 
Total return swaps allow the possibility of short selling. Thus, if a buyer of protection 
believes that the creditworthiness of an issuer will decline, the buyer can then buy a total 
return swap and therefore he would benefit for the change on value of the reference 
obligation. There exists another method of taking short position, that is, the possibility of 
borrowing securities from a dealer and sell them with the idea of buying them back later on at 
a cheaper price in order to repay to the lender of the securities. However, a total return swap 
does not involve these physical transactions.  
Short selling has been one the main financial practices criticised in the current market’s 
financial crisis. These practices have been prohibited and it has caused large debate between 
governments such as the current ban in Germany for short selling practices. Short selling can 
create speculations, disruption and instability on the financial markets.  
Synthetic financing using total return swaps 
A total return swap can also be seen as a balance sheet rental from the protection buyer to the 
seller of the protection. That is when the asset part of the total return swap contract resides in 
a portfolio the buyer removes the economic risk. This risk transfer is made effective without 
the need for a cash sale. In this case, the buyer of the protection will retain the voting rights 
                                                            
33 Credit derivatives and credit Linked Notes, 2nd Edition, Satyajit Das, John Wiley & Sons 2000, p719 
34 http://www.isda.org/educat/faqs.html#26 
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and servicing to the underlying asset and the seller of the protection will have the exposure to 
the underlying asset without the requirement to purchase it. Furthermore, the pricing for the 
financing spread on the contract, will be also determined by the cost of the buyer of the 
protection of financing and servicing the reference obligation on its own balance sheet35. The 
buyer of the protection will also benefit from being able to buy protection for a limited period 
without having to liquidate the asset. When maturity of the total return swap arrives, 
(normally the maturity term will be less than the one for the reference obligation) the buyer 
has the option to either reinvest in that asset or to sell it at market price. 
Another reason for entering into these types of contracts is that include new asset classes and 
these practices have been welcome by some investors such as insurance companies to access 
into some markets where they had traditionally some barriers for accessing to them as stated 
in the 2001 report by the Bank of England on credit derivatives36. 
Credit spread options 
These types of contracts are less common and more sophisticated transactions. Credit options 
determine the creditworthiness of an instrument such as a bond, as the increase of the credit 
spread of the binds over a risk free security37. In this case, the buyer of the protection may 
agree with the seller that during the agreed period in the contract, he has the option to put the 
bonds to the seller if the credit spread goes up or he can call for the seller to transfer the 
bonds to the buyer if the credit spread decreases by indicating that the issuers’ credit is 
improving. 
                                                            
35 David Rule, June 2001: The Credit Derivatives Market: its development and possible implications for 
financial stability. G10 Financial Surveillance Division, Bank of England, Financial Stability review 
 
36 Idem (35) 
 
37 Credit derivatives and credit Linked Notes, 2nd Edition, Satyajit Das, John Wiley & Sons 2000 
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Credit options are put or call options on the price of a floating note, bond or loan, asset swap 
that are normally credit risky instruments that exchanges the cash flows of that instrument for 
a floating rate. The buyer of the protection has if a credit put option the right but not the 
obligation to sell or buy from the option seller a reference asset by specified floating rate at a 
previously specified price (known as the strike price)38. 
Settlement on these types of transactions can be either agreed on a cash or physical basis. 
Contrary to the other types of credit derivatives, CDS and total return swaps, credit options 
only transfers credit risk and not market risk39. The seller of the protection should therefore 
have high credit ratings. 
Credit spread downgrade protection40 
Buyers of credit options are normally banks and financial institutions that are interested in 
hedging (that is to protect themselves against a loss but also losses the chance to make a 
profit), their market exposure to fluctuations in credit spreads, that is they would normally 
hedge long term positions with put options and short positions with call options. As such, 
credit options result very attractive to large banks with leveraged balance sheets. These 
instruments are also used to hedge exposure to downgrade risk. Investors holding portfolios 
with deteriorated assets and forced to sell can also use structured derivatives in order to get 
protection for a possible downgrade. In this particular case scenario the portfolio manager is 
                                                            
38 Credit derivatives and credit Linked Notes, 2nd Edition, Satyajit Das, John Wiley & Sons 2000, p717 
 
39 This is because the yield on the bonds should move in the same way as if there has been no change on the 
credit of the issuer. Therefore, market risk would be excluded 
 
40 For detailed information about credit spreads options concept, risk and valuation please see Annex on 
glossary terms and detailed information on credit derivatives and credit Linked Notes, 2nd Edition, Satyajit Das, 
John Wiley & Sons 2000 
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not forced to sell at distressed prices and allows them to own assets of marginal credit quality 
at lower risk. The risk of the portfolio can then be readjusted. 
Credit options can also be used for certain borrowers that want to make fixed any future 
borrowing costs. Thus, a borrower can hedge exposure to interest rates using interest rate 
derivatives. They can therefore enter into a credit option contract in their own name and lock 
future borrowing costs. 
The different types of credit derivatives are mainly used by institutional investors for hedging 
purposes, that is, to protect themselves against any losses arising from an asset, in order to 
provide liquidity to the markets, also for arbitrage purposes such as the use of different 
markets to make a profit, reduce cost and risks. By using credit derivatives, investors can also 
reduce transactional costs such as custody charges and documentary taxes among others41. 
Part II: 
2.1 Regulatory Approach 
Having discussed the main types of credit derivatives and its different structures, part 
II of the paper, will now focus on the capital regulatory treatment for credit derivatives.  
As already argued one of the main reasons for using credit derivatives is the transfer of credit 
risk. This transfer of risk can be considered either as economic capital relief or regulatory 
capital relief. The main difference between both is that “economic capital implies the 
reduction to be held against a position where the credit derivatives transaction provides 
                                                            
41 JP Morgan research for credit derivatives in collaboration with risk metrics 
www.investinginbonds.com/assets/.../Intro_to_Credit_Derivatives.pdf - 
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effective hedge against the risk of loss”42. On the other side, regulatory capital is the capital 
required to be held against the risk. Regulatory capital is determined by the Basel II Accord 
and the Capital Requirements Directive, (CRD)43. 
In this section, I will therefore discuss the proposals by Basel Committee and the European 
Commission44 on regulatory capital to be held against counterparty credit risk and the impact 
of the new proposals for market participants. The idea is to have a more in depth analysis of 
the current proposals and the challenges that market participants will face once these new 
regulations have been implemented.  In order to better understand the extent of the 
regulations it would be useful to clarify few concepts relating to counterparty risk and the 
methods previously used to measure it. 
Counterparty Risk 
As defined by BIPRU 1345, Counterparty risk is “the risk that the counterparty to a 
transaction could default before the final settlement of the transaction's cash flows”, that is 
the risk that an obligor would not be able to meet his contractual obligations. Counterparty 
risk is part of credit risk and constitutes a feature for derivative contracts. The assessment of 
counterparty risk is sometimes uncertain as it will depend on the future market’s conditions. 
The fact that the exposure arising from a derivative can vary over the life of the transaction, 
makes important to know not only the current market to market risk exposure but also the 
                                                            
42 Credit derivatives and credit Linked Notes, 2nd Edition, Satyajit Das, John Wiley & Sons 2000, Section 19 
 
43 Amendments to Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC “The Capital Requirements Directive (CRD) came 
into force on 1 January 2007. It introduced a supervisory framework in the EU designed to ensure the financial 
soundness of credit institutions (banks, building societies and certain investment firms) and reflects the Basel II 
rules on capital measurement and capital standards” 
44 As agreed on the Pittsburgh Summit in Implementing the G20 Recommendations for Strengthening Financial 
Stability. 
 
45Prudential Sourcebook for Banks, Building Societies and Investment Firms 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/international/bipru13.pdf 
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potential future exposures of a particular financial asset46. These projections can help 
financial institutions to identify the credit risk involved on a specific financial instrument and 
therefore to hold a cushion for any possible future losses. 
During the credit crisis, it has been proved that counterparty risk measures were not accurate 
leading to the biggest problems that the financial markets have faced since the great 
depression. Pre crisis, firms could use three different methods in calculating the exposure of 
their over the counter (OTC) derivatives47. In contrast there are however some other 
derivatives that are traded in regulated exchanges. Most derivatives contracts are nowadays 
negotiated following the ISDA mater Agreements standards48. 
As mentioned, the treatment of counterparty risk measurement for OTC derivatives until now 
has been determined by three different methods:  
The market to market (MTM) method is calculated as the MTM plus the potential future 
exposure (PFE)49 that is determined by a percentage of the notional value of the contract50. 
The Standardised method51 on the other side provides a more risk sensitive method allowing 
a more accurate calculation not simply based on the notional value of the transaction. Finally, 
                                                            
46 Market risk’s factors would be equity prices, interest rate risk, currency risk and commodity risk and their 
volatilities as to how the markets behave. Therefore, market to market risk is the risk of a portfolio loosing value 
due to any of these factors. 
 
47 Paul C Harding “Mastering the ISDA Master Agreements (1992 and 2002)”, FT Prentice Hall, Financial 
times, Great Britain 2004. OTC Derivatives, refer to those bilateral contracts that are negotiated privately 
between the parties without an exchange as an intermediary. 
48 Since 1991 ISDA has published eleven different sets of definitions. However, it was in 2000 when all the 
definitions were consolidated and it was in 2003 and due to the rapid market’s growth when ISDA included the 
first credit derivatives definitions. By this incorporation, ISDA established the most common use documents for 
OTC transactions to be use by market participants. 
49 The counterparty credit risk charge for single name credit derivative transactions in the trading book will be 
calculated using the following potential future exposure add-on factors as by Section 707 of the Basel II Accord. 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs107.pdf?noframes=1 
 
50 Prudential Sourcebook for Banks, Building Societies and Investment Firms. 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/international/bipru13.pdf 
 
51 Trading book capital treatment for specific risk under the standardised methodology can be found on section 
709-718 if Basel II Accord. http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs107.pdf?noframes=1 
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the internal model method if used, would give firms a more effective PFE as its calculation 
would be correlative to the internal risk management of a particular firm52. 
As already discussed the credit crisis has shown that market participants did not price 
counterparty risk correctly. There have been some proposals by the regulators that we will 
discuss later in this paper where they proposed central clearing53 as the best method to 
mitigate risk.54. Clearing at the same time, can occur either bilaterally, between the 
counterparties involved in a bilateral agreement (OTC) or by central counterparty (CCP) at a 
central market level55. 
In July 2009, The European Commission published a Communication paper aimed at 
ensuring efficient safe and sound derivatives markets56. In this paper the Commission’s main 
focus was to identify the main problems implied on the over the counter (OTC) markets 
during the crisis and to address possible solutions for these problems. The Consultation paper 
was followed by a public hearing in September, were all G20 leaders agreed the following: 
All standardised OTC derivatives contracts should be traded on exchanges or electronic 
platforms where appropriate, and cleared through central counterparties by the end of 2012. 
OTC derivatives should be reported to trade repositories, and non-centrally cleared contracts 
should be subject to higher capital requirements57. Following the G20 Pittsburgh Summit, 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) met in October 2009 and made 
                                                            
52 These methods will be later further explained in this paper 
 
53 Clearing can be defined as the procedure by which an organisation acts as an intermediary and assumes the 
role of both buyer and seller for transactions in order to reconcile orders between transacting parties. 
 
54 “While the use of CRM techniques reduces or transfers credit risk, it simultaneously may increase other risks 
to the bank, such as legal, operational, liquidity and market risks. Therefore, it is imperative that banks employ 
robust procedures and processes to control these risks, including strategy; consideration of the underlying credit; 
valuation; policies and procedures; systems; control of roll-off risks; and management of concentration risk 
arising from the bank’s use of CRM techniques and its interaction with the bank’s overall credit risk profile” 
Basel II Accord. http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs107.pdf?noframes=1 
 
55 COM (2009) 563/4 Ensuring efficient, safe and sound derivatives markets. 
 
56 COM(2009) 332 final, http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/financial-markets/docs/derivatives/report_en.pdf 
57 http://www.pittsburghsummit.gov/mediacenter/129639.htm 
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progress on the main elements of the Basel II reforms. The Committee developed concrete 
proposals for capturing counterparty credit risk, especially with regard to OTC derivatives 
exposures58. By the end of July 2010, the BSBC has agreed further amendments to the called 
Basel III proposals for capital and liquidity standards that will affect credit and counterparty 
risk for the treatment of credit derivatives.  
2.2 The Basel Committee of Banking Supervision59 
To understand the regulatory approach to credit derivatives, it is essential to review the 
existing framework under which capital is held against credit risk, that is the risk arising from 
any party of the contract defaulting. Capital requirements are determined under the Basel 
capital adequacy Accords, the first one released in 198860 and subsequently amended by 
Basel II Accord in 2004, currently under review61. Prior to Basel II Accord, bank regulators 
did not have a common international agreement on how credit derivatives could affect bank 
capital requirements. Since the first Basel Accord in 1988 the markets were growing fast and 
national regulators were applying the framework of the Accord very freely specially for off-
                                                            
58 These measures complement the improved capture of trading book risks and securitization exposures. Due to 
the large extent of measures adopted by Basel will mainly focus on counterparty risk measures, CCP and trading 
repositories as to improve market’s transparency.  
59 The Basel Committee of Banking Supervision “is a committee of banking supervisory authorities that was 
established by the central bank governors in 1975. It usually meets at the Bank of International Settlements 
based in Basel”.  The Committee “provides a forum for regular cooperation on banking supervisory matters and 
its main objective is to enhance understanding of key supervisory issues and improve the quality of banking 
supervision worldwide”. Since Basel Committee was established there have been three main Accords and 
subsequent amendments for Banks Capital Adequacy. The Committee is about to enhance the new Basel III 
Accord as a consequence of the credit crisis. For further information about formation and history please visit 
www. www.bis.org/bcbs/ 
60 Bank of International Settlement “proposals for international convergence of capital measurement and capital 
standards 1988” 
 
61 “The scope of application of the Framework will include: “any holding company that is the parent entity 
within a banking group to ensure that it captures the risk of the whole banking group.  Banking groups are 
groups that engage predominantly in banking activities and, in some countries, a banking group may be 
registered as a bank. The Framework will also apply to all internationally active banks at every tier within a 
banking group, also on a fully consolidated basis” As contemplated in the Basel II Accord 
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balance sheet transactions62. The guidelines recommended for regulated banks to hold a 
minimum level of capital of 8% against credit risk. Credit risk was determined in accordance 
with the conversion of all the transactions into risk asset equivalent. The measure was based 
on a system of risk weighting determined by the type of transaction, maturity and the quality 
of the counterparty63. However, the Accord did not have special mention to credit derivatives. 
As mentioned, off balance sheet derivative transactions’ calculation was based on a market to 
market (MTM) on the transaction plus and add on factor based as a percentage of the notional 
principal of the transaction for future exposure based on volatile of prices64.  
Credit derivatives become very attractive for commercial banks as it allowed them to transfer 
risk without the need to sell the underlying asset until any credit event occurred. In addition, 
banks had also a regulatory motivation in investing on these transactions. The 8% minimum 
capital requirement was higher on corporate exposures than in investment grade exposures65. 
This helped banks to transfer the risk to other entities that were not necessary subject to the 
same capital requirement. Furthermore, the treatment of regulatory capital was different in 
some jurisdictions. In the UK, for instance the treatment of the Financial Services Authority, 
(FSA), for funded and unfunded transactions was different. Thus, for banks wanting to buy 
protection from another bank, the 8% capital ratio could be reduced; however, it was kept the 
                                                            
62 In April 1995 the Basel Committee published an amendment for off balance sheet items by “recognising the 
effects of netting in the add-ons and to expand the matrix of add-on factors” Basel Capital Accord: treatment of 
potential exposure for off-balance-sheet items Basle April 1995, http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs18.pdf 
 
63 Bank of International Settlement “proposals for international convergence of capital measurement and capital 
standards” 1988 Under the accord, basic regulatory capital position in respect of credit risk on risk weighting 
calculations were of 100% risk weighting on terms loans and funded components and for unfunded 
commitments calculations were of 50% risk weighting. 
 
64 Later amended by recognising the effects of netting in the add-ons and to expand the matrix of add-on 
factors” Basel Capital Accord: treatment of potential exposure for off-balance-sheet items Basle April 1995, 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs18.pdf. 
 
65 The Basel Committee realised a new Basel Accord in 1996 amending the previous one by incorporating 
market risks to the capital Accord. 
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same if the unfunded protection were to be bought from a non bank66. On the other hand, 
under the Basel I Accord, Credit Linked Notes (CLN) did not have any capital requirement 
linked to them67. Previous regulations stated as well that where banks were instead selling 
protection, they had to hold capital as if the CDS had been settled and the underlying asset 
was in their balance sheet68. 
In 2001, Basel committee for banking supervision (BCBS), proposed some changes to Basel 
1988 Accord. In July of the same year, a survey by the Bank of International settlements 
showed the rapid growth of the credit derivatives markets. As shown in the report, positions 
on these types of instruments were from $108 billion in billion at end-June 1998 to $695 
billion at end-June 2001. Market participants noted that the market for credit derivatives was 
diversifying beyond transactions aimed at the restructuring of banks’ balance sheets with the 
entry of new market participants such as insurance companies69. 
The intention of Basel II was to try to harmonise the treatment of credit derivatives as the 
market was growing very rapidly. Regulators tried also to reflect the fact that new market 
participants were now been part of these transactions. 
In June 2004, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision issued the long awaited 
International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: a Revised 
Framework, describing changes to the regulatory capital requirements for banks70. The new 
                                                            
66 Credit risk mitigation (CRM) – techniques used to reduce the credit risk associated with an exposure or 
exposures that a firm holds. http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/international/bipru5.pdf 
 
67 Further information please see Credit derivatives and credit Linked Notes, 2nd Edition, Satyajit Das, John 
Wiley & Sons 2000 p 835 on regulatory framework for Credit linked Notes 
 
68 When referring to previous regulations under Basel Accord section, it does refer to regulatory framework pre 
credit crisis and pre Basel II implementations. 
 
69 BIS Derivatives survey 2001. http://www.bis.org/publ/rpfx02t.pdf 
70 These changes are known as the New Basel Capital Accord, “Basel II.” The new Accord, was under 
discussion since June 1999, is designed to replace the 1988 Basel Accord with a more risk-sensitive set of 
regulations. A key element of the new Accord is greater reliance on banks’ internal rating systems in the 
calculation of regulatory capital charges. Basel II was fully adopted by most banking regulators by 2007.  
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proposals had important consequences for the financial markets. However, after the 
consultation paper the reforms on credit derivatives were welcomed for most of the parties on 
the consultation process. There was however, some criticism by ISDA on the proposed 
residual risk for credit derivatives regarding the size71. The main intention of the new Accord 
was to align more closely the capital requirements with economic risk as well as the 
establishment for credit risk modelling in order to further recognise default correlations with 
bank capital requirements. 
The proposal included two different approaches for banks to calculate their capital required 
for market, operational and credit risk. The idea behind was to be able to retain a minimum 
against bank’s unexpected losses. Under the new Accord, the elements for calculating the 
minimum required was based on: a definition of regulatory capital, risk weighted assets and 
the minimum ratio of capital to risk weighted assets. Thus, the minimum capital requirement 
on risk weighted assets would be an 8% based on the above mentioned measurement72. As 
with regard to credit risk the Basel II Accord leaves banks with the option to decide between 
two different approaches; banks can either use the standardised approach, that is, external 
credit rating provided but credit rating agencies or they can also use their own internal credit 
risk measurement method even if subject to stricter supervisory control. Banks have been 
encouraged to use their own methodologies for risk. However, they have also been obliged to 
use the external approach. This recommendation has created certain criticism as a 
consequence of the credit crisis. The idea of banks being able to use the standardised 
approach has caused many market’s disruptions as there was a culture of shopping around 
amongst the main credit rating agencies to obtain the best ratings. Furthermore, it seems that 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
 
71 Comments on a consultative paper issued by the Basel Committee on banking supervision in June 1999 
http://www.isda.org/press/pdf/baselcaf.pdf. 
 
72 Basel II: Revised international capital framework. http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca.htm 
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the risk of the new securities being rated was not as accurate as markets expected not as 
liquid as they thought either.  
Under the advanced approach, banks are able to develop and apply their own internal capital 
measurement methods. It should be approved by the correspondent financial authorities and it 
is also subject to certain eligibility criteria. Even if the Basel II Accord tried to minimise the 
risks exposure for banks by creating global standards, the Accord has shown some of its 
weaknesses during the credit crisis.  
Basel II is now under discussion and the BCBS is trying to achieve a better approach for 
banks to be able to absorb future losses.  
Current Basel approach: consequence of the crisis (Basel III) 
The financial crisis raised some concerns on the use of credit derivatives instruments and 
there have been many discussions on the way these types of financial instruments should be 
regulated. On the 26th of July of this year, the Basel Committee agreed several amendments 
to the called “Basel III” proposals for capital requirements73. The agreed measures although 
constitute a significant improvement for the financial regulatory framework is still seen as a 
big challenge for some financial institutions. 
The agreement makes material amendments to the main consultations papers already 
proposed by the Committee in December 200974. In Particular, the paper includes proposals 
for the treatment on deductions in capital calculations, requirements for counterparty risk 
(CCR)75 and definitions for leverage ratio and liquidity ratio.  Some of the key amendments 
                                                            
73 The Group of Governors and Heads of Supervision reach broad agreement on Basel Committee capital and 
liquidity reform package. 26 July 2010. http://www.bis.org/press/p100726.htm 
74 Strengthening the resilience of the banking sector - consultative document, December 2009. 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs164.pdf 
75 “In its review of the treatment of counterparty credit risk (CCR), the Committee engaged in a wide-ranging 
effort to ascertain areas where capital requirements for CCR need to be strengthened. In conducting this review, 
the Committee carefully considered: 
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include changes to measurement of counterparty risk and netting of derivatives76. 
Modifications have been made to the calculation of the additional capital charges for CCR 
arising out of derivatives where CCP would be subject to a modest risk weight so that these 
types of exposures are not free risk77. The Annex has also included broader recognition of 
hedging and elimination of a multiplier in calculating the credit valuation adjustment (CVA). 
The main objective of these measures is to contribute to the consolidation of the proposed 
Basel III reform as well as to allow market participants to make a better assessment to 
counterparty risk78. We will therefore now focus on the amendments that will affect 
counterparty risk under the new Basel proposals (Basel III) and its implementation under the 
Capital Requirements Directive. The new changes are in the area of: calculations of the 
capital charge valuation adjustment (CVA), the multiplier for the asset value correlation for 
exposures to large financial institutions and the risk for the market to market and collateral 
exposures to central counterparties. As stated by the Committee in the 2009 consultative 
paper, Banks also will be subject to a capital charge for mark-to-market losses. This will be 
associated with deterioration in the credit worthiness of counterparty. While the current Basel 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
• Areas where the current treatment did not adequately capitalise for the risks during the crisis; 
• The provision of incentives to move bi-lateral OTC derivative contracts to multilateral clearing through central 
counterparties; 
• The provision of incentives to reduce operational risk arising from inadequate margining practices, back-
testing and stress testing; and 
• Whether the changes would contribute to reducing procyclicality”. 
Strengthening the resilience of the banking sector - consultative document, December 2009. 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs164.pdf 
 
76 ISDA defines close out netting as “If a counterparty to an ISDA Master Agreement defaults, the close-out 
netting provisions of the ISDA Master Agreement provide that offsetting credit exposures between the two 
parties will be combined into a single net payment from one party to the other” 
 
77 CCP refers to Counterparty Clearing, the concept, implications and new regulatory changes will be further 
discussed on this paper. 
 
78 Although the Basel committee refer to the main proposed changes on capital definition, leverage ratio, and 
risk weighted assets calculations, we will be focus mainly in this paper in those amendments that directly will 
have an effect on Credit derivatives. For further information on the amendments please see: 
http://www.bis.org/press/p100726.htm. Further analysis of the specific new regime for counterparty credit risk 
will also be seen in more detail on the CRD chapter as affecting specifically the EU which is the focus of this 
paper. 
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II standards cover the risk of a counterparty default, it does not address such the credit 
valuation risk, which has been a greater source of losses than those arising from outright 
defaults79. 
The following are therefore the final changes that will affect counterparty risk80: 
The modification of the bond equivalent approach to address hedging, risk capture, effective 
maturity and double counting. The elimination of the excessive calibration of the CVA as 
proposed in December 2009. Furthermore, by modifying the bond equivalent, the Committee 
has agreed that single CDSs should be included81. 
The asset value correlation adjustment has been maintained at 25% but the size of the 
financial institutions has been increased from $25 billion to $100 billion. This new approach 
will help firms identifying the interconnection between firms as well as to reflect the inherent 
higher risk of exposures to other financial entities. As confirmed in the December 
consultation, financial institutions’ credit quality has deteriorated during the crisis and they 
proved to be relatively more sensitive to systemic risk than nonfinancial firms. The work 
                                                            
79 Strengthening the resilience of the banking sector - consultative document, December 2009. 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs164.pdf 
80 The information contained on this section is based on the main changes proposed by the Basel Committee 
with regard to counterparty credit risk in the following consultation Papers: Strengthening the resilience of the 
banking sector - consultative document, December 2009. http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs164.pdf and The Group 
of Governors and Heads of  Supervision reach broad agreement on Basel Committee capital and liquidity reform 
package, 26 July 2010. http://www.bis.org/press/p100726.htm. 
 
81 “Under the bond equivalent approach, single-name credit default swap (CDS) hedges that reference the 
counterparty to which the bank is exposed will be recognised. This should provide an incentive for banks to 
hedge the CVA risk, which many failed to do prior to the crisis”. The Group of Governors and Heads of  
supervision reach broad agreement on Basel Committee capital and liquidity reform package, 26 July 2010. 
http://www.bis.org/press/p100726.htm. 
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conducted by the Committee indicates that asset value correlations for financial firms were, 
in relative terms, 25% or higher than for non-financial firms82. 
Banks’ mark-to-market and collateral exposures to a central counterparty (CCP) will now be 
subject to a modest risk weight that goes from 1 percent to 3 percent. This is an improvement 
as it would reflect that Bank’s activities should not be risk free83.  
On a later report by Moody’s on the effect of the new proposals, it has been addressed the 
positive aspects that these requirements will imply for market participants. The new changes 
would allow risk to be measure more effectively without penalising market related activities. 
Furthermore, the amendments to CVA will benefit banks with large exposures as it will 
impact bank’s profitability while maintaining an appropriate level of capital charge for these 
activities. Similarly, they think that the increase in the threshold for banks subject to the 
multiplier will prevent small banks becoming subject to an increase in their borrowing costs. 
Importantly the report also points out that the “removal of the zero risk for central 
counterparties acknowledges that this type of exposure carries some risk and limits risk of 
regulatory arbitrage84. The BSBC is still discussing on further regulations. The following are 
the next steps85 
 September 2010: deadline for comments consultative paper on countercyclical capital 
buffers 
                                                            
82 Strengthening the resilience of the banking sector - consultative document, December 2009. 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs164.pdf 
83 In the December Consultation paper the Committee explained “Banks’ collateral and mark-to-market 
exposures to central counterparties meeting these strict criteria will qualify for a zero percent risk weight. These 
criteria, together with strengthened capital requirements for bilateral OTC derivative exposures, will create 
strong incentives for banks to move exposures to such central counterparties”. Strengthening the resilience of 
the banking sector - consultative document, December 2009. http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs164.pdf 
 
84 July 26 Basel III Agreement on Capital and liquidity positive for creditors. Moody’s investors services, end 
August 2010 
85 http://www.bis.org/ 
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 September 2010: meeting of the Governors and Heads of Supervision of the Basel 
Committee, with decisions on finalised calibration and phase-in arrangements 
 November 2010: G20 meeting in Seoul to discuss finalised Basel III proposals 
 December 2010: publication of finalised Basel III proposals, including calibration of 
proposals and determination of new minimum capital ratios. 
There are nonetheless some challenges that market participants will face with the 
implementation of the new Basel II reform. The new set of rules is to be implemented within 
a period of at least five years and therefore investors should not expect changes anytime soon. 
It does however, create further certainty about the future of banking regulation as proposals 
are materialising after many consultation papers being published. Once the implementation of 
the reform has been completed, it will be phased until 2012 over a multi year period. We will 
now analyse how Basel proposals will become law in the European Union through the 
Capital Requirements Directive. 
2.3 The EU regulations: Capital Requirement Directive 
Following Basel III new requirements it is important to further analyse the EU Capital 
requirements Directive. The CRD reflects the Basel II rules on capital measurement and 
capital standards. Therefore, in order to respond to the needs of the financial system and 
following the new proposals by the Basel Committee, the European Commission has 
proposed a series of amendments to the current Capital Requirements Directive86. This part 
will discuss the main changes under the CRD that will affect counterparty credit risk (most of 
these changes are in accordance with Basel II new reforms). 
The Commission proposals for holding higher capital requirement on bilateral clearing 
transactions not able to be cleared through the central houses became a principal after the 
                                                            
86 Commission services staff working document on possible further changes to the capital requirements directive 
on CRD IV. ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/.../consultation_paper_en.pdf.  
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G20 meeting in Pittsburgh87. The Commission confirmed that the best way to do it would be 
by widening the difference of capital charges between centrally cleared and bilaterally 
cleared contracts88. These changes should be consistent with the approach outlined by the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision as already explained in this paper. 
However, even though the approach of the EU on the new regulatory capital requirements is 
in line with the new proposals on Basel II, there are aspects were these would not be exactly 
the same. Thus, since Basel II new approach does not include a 5 percent originators risk-
retention requirement, the new CRD has include this new requirement. Furthermore, Basel II 
reforms have now been almost finalised while the implementation of the CRD will take some 
more time for each member state to adopt it. This also means that although member states 
should adopt the Directive they can also adopt some domestic law measures. In Germany for 
instance the 5 per cent retention risk will be increased up to a 10 per cent from 2013. The 
reason is that they believe that the 5 percent risk retention would not be sufficient for some 
asset classes in securitised products. Similarly, in the UK the FSA, is now reviewing the new 
CRD changes on the FSA’s consultation paper, CP09/2989. The paper sets out the proposals 
required following the first major amendments to the CRD by following some of the aspects 
discussed on the Turner Review90. 
                                                            
87 “Higher capital requirements would reflect the higher risk that such contracts pose to the financial system”. 
The G20 the Pittsburgh summit Leaders’ statement 24 – 25 2009 
http://g20.org/Documents/pittsburgh_summit_leaders_statement_250909.pdf 
 
88 Directive 2006/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 relating to the taking up 
and pursuit of the business of credit institutions 
89 http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Policy/CP/2009/09_29.shtml on Directive of the European Parliament 
and of the council  amending directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC as regards capital requirements for the 
trading book and for re-securitisations, and the supervisory review of remuneration policies sec(2009) 974 final. 
 
 
90 The Turner Review: A regulatory response to the global banking crisis. March 2009. The UK Proposals 
include: “Improving the quality of firms’ capital by establishing clear EU-wide criteria for assessing the 
eligibility of hybrid capital to be counted as part of a firm’s overall capital. The proposals specify the features 
that hybrid capital must have regarding permanence, flexibility of payments and loss absorbency to be eligible 
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The CRD reforms introduce new requirement for securitisation products. The main changes 
have been approved under CRD 2 and some of them will directly affect credit derivatives 
exposures as with regard to the improvement in risk management of securitization, “including 
a requirement to ensure that a firm does not invest in a securitization unless the originator 
retains an economic interest.91” This is known as the originators risk retention: 
Originators risk-retention 
The new CRD requires under Section 7, article 122a that originators should hold at least a 5 
per cent net income interest. The retention risk measure also implies that the burden of proof 
would be for the originators, that is, they have to make sure that they disclose this 
information to the credit institutions they are negotiating with92. The idea of placing the 
burden of proof into them will prevent some third party credit institutions entering into some 
types of transactions as originators will have to disclose that they are retaining a 5 per cent of 
net economic income but banks negotiating with third parties should prove this. This makes it 
difficult for some securitised products that have been transferred between different parties93. 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
as tier one capital; Enhancing the management of large exposures by restricting a firm’s lending beyond a 
certain limit to any one party; Improving the risk management of securitization, including a requirement to 
ensure that a firm does not invest in a securitization unless the originator retains an economic interest; 
Strengthening the capital requirements for the trading book to ensure that a firm’s assessment of the risks 
connected with its trading book better reflects the potential losses from adverse market movements in stressed 
conditions; Imposing higher capital requirements for re-securitizations to make sure that firms take proper 
account of the risks of investing in such complex financial products; and upgrading disclosure standards to 
increase market confidence”. 
91 FSA consultation paper CP09/29 
 
92  Article 122a of the CRD II , Directive 2009/111/EC of the European parliament and of the council of 16 
September 2009 amending Directives 2006/48/EC, 2006/49/EC and 2007/64/EC as regards banks affiliated to 
central institutions, certain own funds items, large exposures, supervisory arrangements, and crisis management. 
“A credit institution, other than when acting as an originator, a sponsor or original lender, shall be exposed to the 
credit risk of a securitisation position in its trading book or non-trading book only if the originator, sponsor or 
original lender has explicitly disclosed to the credit institution that it will retain, on an ongoing basis, a material 
net economic interest which, in any event, shall not be less than 5 %”. 
 
93 This aspect has been discussed by Leonard Ng on Changes to Basel and EU capital requirements Directive: 
Implications for securitisation, Journal of International Banking Law and regulation, 2010 
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In the US, the recently approved Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act has adopted a very similar approach by requiring as well five percent retention for the 
originator. Section 941 of the act specifies that there should be: (I) not less than 5 percent of 
the credit risk for any asset94. However, in difference with the EU proposals, the Act does not 
require investors not to invest unless they can be sure that the originator is holding a five per 
cent. 
The intention of the regulators by applying this new requirement is to try to avoid for the 
originators the possibility to transfer all the risk as in doing so it has been proved during the 
crisis that originators securitised instruments were not as diligent as if they would have been 
obliged to retain a certain percentage. 
Article 122a (1) defines in more detailed “retention of net economic interest95”. The article 
establishes that this retention should not be use for hedging or risk mitigation purposes96. 
This is important as credit institutions were previously using retention if any to hedge their 
risks and therefore when the problems came there was not enough cushions to support all the 
losses. The article includes also an exception for credit default swaps that are not use to 
hedge a securitisation97. This new measure is important for securitisation however as seen in 
                                                            
94Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act). 
95 For the purpose of this Article, “retention of net economic interest” means:(a) retention of no less than 5 % of 
the nominal value of each of the tranches sold or transferred to the investors; (b) in the case of securitisations of 
revolving exposures, retention of the originator’s interest of no less than 5 %of the nominal value of the 
securitised exposures; (c) retention of randomly selected exposures, equivalent to no less than 5 % of the 
nominal amount of the securitised exposures, where such exposures would otherwise have been securitised in 
the securitisation, provided that the number of potentially securitised exposures is no less than 100 at 
origination; or (d) retention of the first loss tranche and, if necessary, other tranches having the same or a more 
severe risk profile than those transferred or sold to investors and not  maturing any earlier than those transferred 
or sold to investors, so that the retention equals in total no less than 5 % of the nominal value of the securitised 
exposures 
 
96 “Net economic interest is measured at the origination and shall be maintained on an ongoing basis. It shall not 
be subject to any credit risk mitigation or any short positions or another hedge. The net economic interest shall 
be determined by the notional value for off-balance sheet items”. Article 122a (1) 
 
97 credit default swaps where these instruments are not used to package and/or hedge a securitisation that is 
covered by paragraph 
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the German example, in their opinion a 5 per cent should not be enough for some 
securitisation, although it has not been detailed yet the extent of the increase. 
However, the Directive does not include any specific sanctions for non compliance with this 
article, and it would be at the discretion of the EU regulator to decide on this. 
It seems therefore, that market participants will be facing some challenges with regard to the 
5 percent risk retention measure. On one side, it seems that the idea of the EU to try to reach 
common risks retention standards is creating a rather more challenging position for market 
participants across Europe as they will be subject to different standards in different 
jurisdictions. This could lead with market participants trying to find other forms to avoid 
restrictive requirements by looking into less regulated jurisdictions. It is however still 
difficult to ascertain how market participants will behave, but if the new proposals limit their 
business nature, they could end up finding other ways in order to obtain higher returns. The 
new requirements are expected to take effect from 1 January 2011.  
The CRD2 and CRD3 amendments will be supplemented by the latest consultation paper 
published by the Commission working paper staff on possible further changes to the capital 
requirements directive (CRD IV)98. 
In this latest paper, the Commission had identified five main changes that should be 
addressed to better manage counterparty risk. That is, an improved measurement to better 
address counterparty credit risk, a multiplier for the asset correlation for large financial 
institutions, the introduction of further standards for collateral management and the 
establishment of central counterparties that could help to reduce systemic risk that arises from 
derivatives products hold by financial institutions. The main reason for these changes is “to 
raise the capital buffers backing theses exposures (derivatives, repos and securities financing 
                                                            
98 Commission services staff working document, possible further changes to the capital requirements Directive. 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/docs/2010/crd4/consultation_paper_en.pdf 
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activities), as well as to reduce the procyclicality and to provide additional help reducing 
systemic risk99”.  
The Commission has tried to include some new methods of measurement that would help 
market participants to better address counterparty risk. The new proposals would have to be 
adapted to the standardised approach to credit risk100.  
The reform mentions the inclusion of a more effective potential exposure by including a new 
metric that will also reflect “a period of stress to address general wrong way risk101”. Under 
the counterparty credit risk, mark-to-market method, a firm must also calculate potential 
future exposure arising out of its over-the-counter (OTC) derivative contracts. For credit 
derivatives, the potential future exposure would be either 5% or 10% of the notional value of 
the derivative, depending on whether a direct exposure to the underlying reference name 
would meet the definition of a qualifying debt security102. The CRD amendments, limit the 
PFE for written credit default swaps. In this case, the PFE will be limited to the present value 
of the future premiums owed by the swap counterparty103. 
The intention of the regulators is to include a metric based on markets volatility and periods 
of stress as this would contemplate a more realistic exposure. Furthermore, the new approach 
                                                            
99 Commission services staff working document, possible further changes to the capital requirements Directive. 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/docs/2010/crd4/consultation_paper_en.pdf 
 
100 Commission services staff working paper on possible further changes to the capital requirements directive. 
 
101 General wrong way risk arises when the PD of counterparties is positively correlated with general market 
risk factors. Directive 2006/48/EC of the European parliament and of the council of 14 June 2006 relating to the 
taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions (recast) 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/lexuriserv/lexuriserv.do?uri=consleg:2006l0048:20100330:en:pdf 
 
102 2006/49/EC Annex II, point 7 
 
103 The present value of the unpaid premium effectively represents a cap on the market value of the position, i.e. 
if the spread on the reference name fell to zero, the positive value to the option seller would equal the discounted 
value of the unpaid premium. 
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should be also in consistency with the recent revisions market to market risk stress value at 
risk104.  
The Committee, as with Basel, has also proposed the incorporation of a credit valuation 
adjustment (CVA) associated with the deterioration of counterparty that will be determined 
by using the specific market capital charge required already for a hypothetical bond 
equivalent position. Under this approach single CDS hedges that reference to the 
counterparty to which the institution is exposed will also be recognised105.   
Similarly, The CRD106 also gives firms the option of including all credit derivatives when 
calculating counterparty credit risk requirements. That is “an institution may want to include 
for the purposes of calculating capital requirements for counterparty credit risk all the credit 
derivatives in the trading book forming part of the internal hedges107”. However, non trading 
book exposures “shall not be deemed to be hedged for the purposes of calculating capital 
requirements unless purchased from a third party protection provided that meets the credit 
risk mitigation requirements108”. Financial institutions will be required to do this either by 
including all credit derivatives in the counterparty risk calculation or by assigning a zero 
value to derivatives used for hedging.109 
                                                            
104 A technique used to estimate the probability of portfolio losses based on the statistical analysis of historical 
price trends and volatilities. Directive 2006/48/EC of the European parliament and of the council of 14 June 
2006 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions (recast).http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/lexuriserv/lexuriserv.do?uri=consleg:2006l0048:20100330:en:pdf Calculation of risk weighted 
exposure amounts for equity exposures under the internal models approach. Capital requirement and risk 
quantification. 
105 Commission services staff working document, possible further changes to the capital requirements Directive. 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/docs/2010/crd4/consultation_paper_en.pdf 
 
106 2006/48/EC Annex III, Part 2, point 3; and 2006/49/EC Annex II, point 1 
 
107 Commission Directive 2009/27/EC of 7 April 2009 amending certain annexes to directive 2006/49/EC of the 
European parliament and of the council as regards technical provisions concerning risk management. 
 
108 point 19 of Part 2 of Annex VIII to Directive 2006/48/EC  
 
109 FSA consultation paper CP09/29 
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The Committee has also included some new charges to correlation trading exposures. 
Correlation trading is used by financial institutions to hedge concentration of risk and 
corporate portfolio risk110. Banks in general act as market makers by providing customers 
with credit protection based on tranches of either bespoke portfolios or indices. They also 
made the structure and price tranches required by their customers using tranched credit 
derivatives. The CRD new approach is that for instruments in the trading book that are 
securitisation positions, banks shall weight with the following its net positions as if the 
securitisation positions would be subject to the Standardised Approach for credit risk in the 
same institution's non-trading book. Thus, at 8% of the risk weight will apply111.  The new 
regulation does replace however the market making exemption112 . 
Furthermore, the paper also addresses the need to implement an express Pillar 1 capital 
charge for specific wrong way risk. If there is a legal connection between the counterparty 
and the underlying issuer, single CDS would be used as the exposure at default of the 
counterparty113. The aim is to tackle some of the deficiencies in identifying the quality of 
some counterparties that contributed with many losses during the crisis. However, the fact 
                                                            
110 The CRD amendments define the correlation trading portfolio as securitisation and nth-to-default credit 
derivatives that meet the following criteria: 
• Positions are neither: re-securitisation positions; options on a securitisation tranche; or any other derivatives of 
securitisation exposures that do not provide a pro-rata share in the proceeds of a securitisation tranche. 
• All reference instruments are single-name instruments, including single- name credit derivatives, for which a 
liquid two-way market exists. 
The new amendments also specifically exclude positions where the underlying reference assets are: retail 
exposures; residential and commercial mortgages; or claims on special purpose entities 
 
111 as set out in Part 4 of Annex IX to Directive 2006/48/EC 
 
112 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directives 2006/48/EC and 
2006/49/EC as regards capital requirements for the trading book and for resecuritisations, and the supervisory 
review of remuneration policies. 
 
113 Exposure at default is used as the notional amount of the bond and it is based on future exposure, the EAD 
will factor in upfront some potential adverse future variations in exposure. Commission services staff working 
document, possible further changes to the capital requirements Directive. 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/docs/2010/crd4/consultation_paper_en.pdf 
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that there is none established method for this will become a new challenge for market 
participants as to how to apply this new requirements. 
The Committee also proposes a higher risk weight requirement for exposures of financial 
institutions with non financial institutions and the idea would be to apply a multiplier to the 
asset value correlation to all exposures to unregulated firms in accordance with Basel. 
The Commission will propose legislation for market participants that are not able to clear 
through central houses because of the nature of the structure, to be able to hold enough 
collateral in order to avoid any further risks. There is consideration to strengthen the margins 
for collateral management in bilateral clearing proposing an increase in the margin period of 
risk for certain netting sets. That is, regarding the variation margin requirement, it has been 
recommended for non institutional parties that these “should be tailored in such a way that 
they do not undermine the corporate sector's ability to use derivatives for transferring risk, 
especially in the case of companies whose use of derivatives is below a given threshold114”.  
There are also some changes to the standard rules for securitisation positions and nth-to-
default credit derivatives that will affect the calculation of counterparty risk115.  
The CRD amendments establishes that institutions with positions in a first-to-default credit 
derivative will be permitted to off-set the specific risk of the reference entity, to which the 
lowest specific risk percentage charge applies116.  
                                                            
114 Commission services staff working document, possible further changes to the capital requirements Directive. 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/docs/2010/crd4/consultation_paper_en.pdf 
 
115 On an answer from Calyon to the Basel Committee with regard to these types of products they stated ““Yet 
nth to Default are a type of CDO and a CDO tranche is roughly equivalent to a combination of nth to Default. In 
fact, both products (CDO and nth to Default) are options on a basket of CDS, and should be treated as such 
rather than as securitized”. Comments on the consultative documents “Guidelines for Computing Capital for 
Incremental Risk in the Trading Book” (bcbs149) and “Revisions to the Basel II market risk framework” March 
11th, 2009, http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs14849/ca/calyon.pdf  
 
116First-to-default credit derivatives “Where an institution obtains credit protection for a number of reference 
entities underlying a credit derivative under the terms that the first default among the assets shall trigger 
payment and that this credit event shall terminate the contract, the institution may offset specific risk for the 
reference entity to which the lowest specific risk percentage charge among the underlying reference entities 
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As stated in the Commission Directive 2009/27/EC of 7 April 2009, “a firm with a long 
position in a basket of underlying reference entities and a short position in an nth-to-default 
credit derivative on the same basket will only be permitted to off-set specific risk if 
protection has also been obtained for defaults 1 to n-1, or when n-1 defaults have already 
occurred. If n-1 defaults have already occurred then the protection buyer may off-set the 
specific risk of the reference entity to which the lowest specific risk percentage charge 
applies”.117 The idea under these new regulations is to avoid that by transferring risk some 
entities could be left risk free. The use of credit derivatives as we have seen helped in 
transferring the risk and especially by the use of structured products diversification and risk 
transfer was easier for investors. By restricting their positions on these instruments there will 
be as well a better analysis of their risk taken. 
Having now analysed the new capital requirements for trading and non trading book credit 
derivatives, this paper describes now the main reason for proposing central counterparty 
clearing by the G20 leaders as well as the challenges that market participants will face in this 
respect. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
applies according to Table 1 of this Annex”. Commission Directive 2009/27/EC of 7 April 2009 amending 
certain annexes to directive 2006/49/EC of the European parliament and of the council as regards technical 
provisions concerning risk management 
 
117 The FSA for instance currently require firms that hold securitisation credit derivatives in their trading book to 
hold capital against their market risk using either the standard rules in BIPRU 7.11 or an approved VaR model. 
When the CRD amendments are implemented firms will not be allowed to calculate their capital requirements 
for any securitisation positions, including securitisation credit derivatives, using their regulatory VaR model”. 
With the exception of positions that meet the correlation trading carve-out firms that hold securitisation credit 
derivatives in their trading book will be required to use the standard rules to calculate their market risk capital 
requirements. The new amendments also require the seller of protection on nth-to-default credit derivatives held 
in the trading book to calculate the specific risk capital charge using the rating of the derivative and applying 
this relevant securitisation framework risk weighting.   
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Central Counterparties 
The following section analyses the proposals by the European Commission on Derivatives 
and Market Infrastructures118 and the latest Commission Services staff working document on 
possible further changes to the capital requirement Directive (CRD IV).  
A central counterparty (CCP) as defined by the Committee is an entity that interposes itself 
between counterparties to a contract traded within one or more financial markets, becoming 
the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer119. A CCP can play an important role to 
reduce the systemic risk arising from exposures formed by holdings of derivatives products 
by banks and other financial institutions. However, a CCP also concentrates risk. Therefore, 
if it lucks of insufficient risk management processes could increase systemic risk. In order to 
avoid such situations, supervisors need to ensure that a CCP has in place strong risk 
management procedures with strict rules/standards governing all aspects of its operations. 
The Commission is about to terminate drafting legislation on clearing of standardised OTC 
contracts. As agreed by the G20 all standardised OTC contracts should be centrally cleared 
by the end of 2012. The aim is to make mandatory for standardised contracts to be centrally 
cleared through clearing houses and it intends to establish higher supervision to non 
standardised contract as well. The idea shared the G20 “is to propose legislation governing 
their activities so as to eliminate any discrepancies among national legislations and ensure 
                                                            
118 This Paper follows the EU Communication on “ensuring efficient, safe and sound derivatives markets”, 
Published in July 2009. 
119 Commission services staff working document, possible further changes to the capital requirements Directive. 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/docs/2010/crd4/consultation_paper_en.pdf. 
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safety, soundness and proper governance”.  The following legislation for clearing houses has 
been proposed120: 
1. Conduct of business and governance which will include measures for transparency of 
risks. 
2. CCP participants will benefit from the lowest possible regulatory capital charge for 
counterparty credit risk of centrally-cleared contracts, following the regime currently 
being finalised by the Basel Committee. In view of their key role in managing risks, 
CCPs should be subject to adequate capital requirements. 
3. Legal protection to collateral and positions provided by clearing members’ customers. 
4. Authorisation by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) to operate 
in the EU. 
5. Cooperation of ESMA with the Commission in order to be able to raise further issues. 
The Commission has suggested two different approaches currently under discussion. They 
propose on one side to have a central counterparty (CCP) that would decide to clear certain 
contracts and then pass it to the competent authorities (ESMA) that will take the last 
decisions. The other approach would be to rather have ESMA to determine which contract 
should be subject to the clearing obligation. However, in order to be subject to the clearing 
obligation there are certain requirements that have to be met. That is, financial counterparties 
should clear all eligible contracts in the relevant CCPs listed in the register. Furthermore, the 
obligation also applies for financial counterparties entering into derivatives contract with 
third parties entities. Finally, in order to be eligible for clearing, the parties should actively 
become a member or a client. The Commission have also addressed the fact that in order to 
                                                            
120 Public consultation on derivatives and market infrastructures, 14 June 2010. 
ec.europa.eu/...market/consultations/docs/.../derivatives/100614_derivatives.pdf 
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be eligible for clearing there should be in place a procedure which will be implemented by 
Law. CCPs should therefore be authorised by a competent authority to clear specific class of 
derivatives. Once approved, market participants should be able to have access to clearing 
.This authority would then inform ESMA. Subsequently, ESMA will decide whether that 
class would be eligible for clearing and if so it would then be registered. 
In order to avoid any further systemic risk, the Commission would be adopting threshold for 
large exposures. Is a non financial institution were to pass the proposed threshold would be 
subject to the clearing obligation. 
However, for a CCP to succeed there are some other areas that should be also harmonised. 
The challenges where described in Annex III, Part 2, Point 6 of Directive 2006/48/EC. 
Thus, a CCP should have a separate initial capital that would cover against either operational 
or residual risks. It should also try to assess its exposure to each clearing member. 
In order to cover some exposures until liquidation would occur, a CCP should be able to 
collect “margins to limit its credit exposures”. It should also adopt the relevant models that 
would help in capturing risks. A CCP should also be able to segregate and ensure protection 
of the margins posted against default of other clearing members. 
As with regard to default it becomes important to address that a CCP should maintain a 
default fund to cover losses arising from default of one or more members. The contributions 
should of course be proportional to the exposures. 
Furthermore, the Commission has also pointed out that a CCP should be able to have enough 
available capital for unexpected losses. This capital should be in addition to the initial capital. 
As required with financial institutions it has been proposed that CCPs run stress test scenarios 
to avoid any liquidity problems. Furthermore, CCPs should be able to request funds from non 
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defaulting members in the event of an existing member defaulting. The Commission has also 
pointed out that to cover losses it should first use the margin of a defaulting member, if these 
were not enough it should then use the fund’s contributions of the default member but it 
should never use margin from non defaulting members to cover losses resulting from the 
default of another clearing member. 
The Consultation paper, also establishes that a CCP would be able to accept also as collateral. 
It should however accept only highly liquid collateral with minimal market and risk. 
Financial instruments posted as margins should be deposited with operators of securities 
settlement system. Furthermore when investing, a CCP should consider the overall credit risk 
exposures for individual obligors as well121. 
In case of default of any clearing member, a CCP should also have in place a procedure. That 
is, a CCP should ensure that the closing out of any clearing member’s positions does not 
disrupt its operations or expose the non defaulting clearing members to any losses. Default 
procedures should be enforceable by taking into account national insolvency laws applicable 
to defaulting member.  
It seems that the creation of a central counterparty although would benefit the clearing of 
derivatives contracts, it can also create some further disruptions as concentration of risks if 
not well managed could have severe consequences. Furthermore, as we have seen no all OTC 
contracts are centrally cleared and there would be still a gap even if higher capital 
requirements are required for those contracts not being centrally cleared. Additionally, the 
different approaches that solvency laws have in different jurisdictions could also cause big 
                                                            
121 European Commission, 14 June, 2010, Public consultation on derivatives and market infrastructures. 
ec.europa.eu/...market/consultations/docs/.../derivatives/100614_derivatives.pdf 
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challenges for market participants that would try to look for the one that would benefit them 
the most. 
Part III: 
3.1 Conclusions 
The main focus of this paper has been the new regulatory requirements that will affect 
in some way market participants dealing with credit derivatives in the European Union. 
Specially, I have focussed my discussion in those changes with regard to counterparty credit 
risk that the use of credit derivatives involves. 
The credit crisis has shown a series of weaknesses in the current regulatory framework for 
counterparty credit risk exposure arising from derivatives. Financial institutions were not 
properly prepared against the risk they were assuming during the crisis. Capital Markets 
before the collapse of Lehman were already distinguished by their volatility; there was 
nonetheless continuity on the security markets although the credit derivatives market was 
already less active. Volatile prices in securitisations have played also an important role during 
the crisis as it has served to measure potential future market risks with the use of CDS 
spreads, equity and bond prices. 
Furthermore, the existing regulatory framework did not include the already discussed credit 
valuation adjustments or wrong way risk that could help in the capture for future counterparty 
credit risk. Securitisation bonds when used as collateral were being rated in the same way as 
corporate bonds without assuming the intrinsic risk of the assets as stated by the Commission 
working paper staff on new capital requirements (CRD IV). Securitisation was supposed to 
spread risks however its complexity and mispricing made financial institutions more 
vulnerable to the risks that they were taking when increasing their leverage. 
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In 2007 when sub-prime mortgages started to disrupt the credit markets and losses where 
spread globally through the credit derivative markets problems started to arise for banks. 
They had to write down from their own balance-sheets; there was at the same time a 
downgrade of credit ratings on their debt by the credit rating agencies. At this time banks 
were not able to support their lost as they did not have in place an appropriate capital cushion. 
Market’s uncertainty kept therefore, investors aside from riskier positions. As a consequence, 
governments took action trying to avoid further disastrous economic global effects by 
injecting money into the financial markets. However, it was not only counterparty risk 
implied on the use of derivatives and especially in credit derivatives and structured products, 
the problem as many regulators have already explained was also a failure by financial 
institutions to properly manage counterparty credit risk exposures. 
It seems however, that for the last ten years, due to the actions of market participants 
regulators have been trying to further regulate and standardise unregulated financial 
instruments that were playing a major role in the distribution and transfer of credit risk. 
We have seen in the recent credit crisis cases scenarios such as the collapse of Lehman or 
AIG (although helped by the government), that credit derivatives did imply transfer of higher 
risk than expected. Also that the interconnection between financial institutions was of a great 
extent and that by spreading risk, this have caused a major systemic risk across the 
international financial markets. As a result, there have been as already explained in this paper 
numerous proposals by regulators on how to correct these problems. However, market’s 
practices seems to be the answer as to whether regulators would be or not successful on their 
new regulatory approaches for the future years. 
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Greater regulation of counterparty credit risk would imply a higher likeliness to better capture 
risk of future exposures by market participants. However, there are yet some new challenges 
that market participants will have to face as well. 
As discussed along this paper if there is a new regulatory framework it has to be implemented 
first. Some of the Basel and Capital requirements Directive proposals will take at least until 
the end of 2012 to be implemented. Therefore, changes will not come anytime soon. 
Furthermore, the CRD will have to be implemented by the EU member states in order to 
become part of their national laws. Member states as we have seen in the case of Germany, 
can also apply additional legislation to their current regulatory framework. If this were the 
case, instead of reaching a harmonised framework, market participants could face more 
challenges while dealing within different regimes. The consequences could be that market 
participants move towards less regulated jurisdictions or to those where regulations will 
benefit them the most. Discrepancy in the financial regulatory framework by the major 
market drivers economies such as the US and EU, could contribute to change the focus of 
market participants towards jurisdictions where the regulatory framework could be less 
restrictive. 
Banks as corporations have also responsibility towards their shareholders on profit 
maximisation. As such, the capital requirements established in the use of some financial 
instruments could move financial institutions towards different market practices. Greater 
regulation although we have seen that it has positive aspects can also restrain financial 
innovation. 
The establishment of higher capital requirements will help to mitigate future counterparty risk 
to market participants. However, the success of the new regulatory framework will depend on 
how market participants will implement these and also on their practices.  
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Furthermore, the creation of a central counterparty for clearing implies as well further 
challenges. As discussed, not all OTC contracts will necessarily be cleared through CCP as 
there will be still be a number of bespoke contracts in place to able to respond to some 
investor’s needs. 
The aim of regulators to move all OTC contracts to central clearing and imposing higher 
capital requirements for OTC contracts not being cleared through CCP could be read for 
some market participants as a rather penalising measure to move to central clearing. 
Furthermore, the idea of concentrating all the risk in a sole body could lead to future market 
disruptions and even systemic risk if not efficiently managed. If a central counterparty were 
to default the consequences could be disastrous not to say the criticism that a potential bailout 
of the central body could face in the event of being necessary. 
I believe that the attitude of market participants with regard to the new regulatory approach 
would be essential in order to succeed. This means that market players have to be aware of 
the new regulatory framework and new practices. Furthermore, greater supervision in order to 
make sure that regulations are indeed implemented and subsequently complied would be an 
important factor. Therefore, although counterparty risk could be measure, OTC derivatives 
centrally cleared and further disclosure could be required, market participants should be 
aware and knowledgeable about the new regulatory framework to be able to succeed. 
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
 
 
Affirmation (of a trade confirmation) 
 
A procedure in a confirmation process, whereby a single record of the trade is created by one 
party evidencing the full terms of the trade and the counterparty verifies and agrees to that 
record. Affirmation of trade confirmations is different from trade verification (also known as 
economic affirmation), which is limited to principal economic terms. 
 
Allocation (of trades) 
 
The decomposition of a block of trades by an investment manager into component sets of 
trades for individual clients of the manager. 
 
Amendment 
 
A change or addition to the terms of a trade which may require an amended confirmation 
Also, a change or addition to the legal documentation of a trade which, when properly signed 
and therefore executed, has the same legal power as the original agreement. 
 
Arbitrage CDO 
 
A collateralized bond obligation that exploits spread differences between high yield sub-
investment grade bonds and less risky investment-grade securities. Can be either cash flow 
coupons are paid from cash flows of the bonds or market value the principal is paid by selling 
the underlying bond assets. 
 
Asset Swap 
 
A combination of purchase of a fixed coupon asset and entry into an off-market interest rate 
swap that has the effect of transforming the asset into an almost pure credit play 
 
Asset Swap Spread 
 
The spread over the LIBOR rate received by the asset swap buyer in an asset swap it reflects 
the price and credit quality of the asset. 
 
Basel Capital Accord 
 
The framework of rules within which banks calculate their regulatory capital requirement 
These rules where produced by the Basel Committee on Bank Supervision in 1988, known as 
the Basel Capital Accord. The current rules are under review and will be superseded by a new 
framework in 2004. 
 
 
 
Cash Flow CLO 
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A collateralised loan obligation that is used by banks to obtain regulatory capital relief on a 
pool of loans held on balance sheet. The loans are moved off the balance sheet into an SPV, 
and the credit risk is transferred to the purchasers of the issued notes. 
 
Credit Event 
 
A legal definition that is used to characterise the nature of the event that triggers the payout 
on a credit derivative it may include such events as bankruptcy, default, and restructuring. 
 
Credit Spread Option 
 
A derivative contract in which the option buyer has the right but not the obligation to enter 
into a credit spread position at a predetermined credit spread. The credit position may be a 
default swap, par floater, or an asset swap. 
 
Cash flow/payments generation 
 
The process of determining rate and spot price values on which payments are based and then 
calculating payment obligations. 
 
Cash flow/payments matching 
 
The process of matching or confirming upcoming payment obligations with counterparties 
prior to settlement date 
 
Cash flow/payments reconciliation 
 
The process of reviewing accounts to determine if cash movements have been executed 
correctly and funds have been paid out or received on correct value date Also known as 
nostro reconciliation. 
 
Cash flow/payments settlement 
 
The actual execution of cash movement for payments due 
 
Central counterparty (CCP) 
 
An entity that interposes itself between counterparties to 
contracts traded in one or more financial markets, becoming the buyer to every seller and 
seller to every buyer 
 
Closeout 
 
Acceleration and termination of a contract prior to its maturity 
 
Closeout netting 
 
An arrangement to settle all contracted but not yet due obligations to and claims on a 
counterparty by one single net payment, immediately upon the occurrence of one of the 
events of default defined in the relevant documentation. 
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Collateral 
 
An asset that is delivered by the collateral provider to secure an obligation to the collateral 
taker Collateral arrangements may take different legal forms; securities collateral may be 
obtained using the method of title transfer or pledge. 
 
Counterparty credit risk 
 
The risk that a counterparty will not settle an obligation in full value, either when due or at 
any time thereafter 
 
Default 
 
Failure to satisfy an obligation when due, or the occurrence of a defined event of default 
agreed by the parties to a contract. 
 
 
Default Swap 
 
A bilateral contract in which one party (the protection buyer) makes periodic payments to the 
protection seller. In return, the protection seller compensates the protection buyer for any loss 
on a par amount of a reference asset following a credit event. 
 
Equity 
 
The lowest (usually unrated) tranche of a portfolio trade, which is exposed to the first losses 
in the portfolio Due to the high level of risk, the equity tranche is often retained by the 
sponsor and for banks, resulting in a one-for-one capital charge. 
. 
First-to-Default Basket 
 
A bilateral contract in which one party (the protection buyer) makes periodic payments to the 
protection seller. In return, the protection seller compensates the protection buyer for any loss 
on a par amount of the first asset in a group of assets to default. It is also possible to trade 
second, third, etc..., to-default baskets. 
 
Floating-Rate Note 
 
A bond that makes periodic coupon payments linked to a variable interest rate index. 
Typically, the bond pays an additional "spread" that is intended to bring the price of the bond 
to (or close to) par on the issue date of the bond. It can be shown that this "par floater spread" 
reflects the credit quality of the note issuer. 
 
Interest Rate Swap 
 
A bilateral derivative contract involving the exchange of fixed-rate payments for floating rate 
payments typically linked to the LIBOR interest rate index. Typically used to hedge interest 
rate risk 
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LIBOR 
 
The London Inter-Bank Offered Rate. This is an interest rate at which highly rated (typically 
AA-rated) banks can borrow. It is calculated by polling 16 banks daily (through their London 
branches) to determine the rate at which they can borrow for various terms and in various 
currencies. For each term and currency, the received rates are ranked in ascending order, the 
top and bottom four are rejected, and an average of the remaining eight is taken. 
 
Mezzanine 
 
The intermediate tranche of a portfolio trade that is protected from losses by having a 
subordinate equity piece below it 
 
Netting 
 
An offsetting of positions or obligations by counterparties. See closeout netting, multilateral 
netting and payments netting. 
 
Novation 
 
The replacement of a contract between two initial counterparties to a contract (the transferor, 
who steps out of the deal and the remaining party) with a new contract between the remaining 
party and a third party (the transferee). Also referred to as assignment. 
 
Over-the-counter (OTC) 
 
A method of trading that does not involve an exchange. In over the- counter markets, 
participants trade directly with each other, typically by telephone or computer links. 
 
Portfolio Default Swap 
 
A default swap that hedges some portion of the credit risk of a portfolio of credits, typically 
consisting of 40-100 names. The credit risk is tranched up and sold to investors. Each tranche 
is exposed to losses on the portfolio between two bands. For example, a senior tranche may 
be exposed to all of the losses occurring between 20%-100% of the portfolio. A riskier 
mezzanine tranche may be exposed to the losses in the portfolio beginning at 5% of the 
portfolio and ending at 20%. The riskiest equity tranche is the exposed to the first loss, say 
the first 5%. 
 
Prime brokerage 
 
The provision by firms (eg large securities firms) of credit, clearing, securities lending and 
other services to clients (typically hedge funds). In OTC derivatives transactions, prime 
brokerage refers to an arrangement that permits a customer (typically a hedge fund) to use 
multiple dealers to execute OTC derivatives trades while clearing and settling those trades 
through a single prime broker. For each trade, the prime broker becomes the counterparty to a 
deal with the customer and the counterparty to a deal with the executing dealer. 
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Principal Protected Note 
 
A security that guarantees to return all of the investor’s principal at maturity. This feature is 
often attached to credit-linked notes where the spread paid by the asset is very high and the 
investor wishes to protect his/her downside. For a credit linked note, the cost of the protection 
is usually a loss or reduction in the coupon on the note following the credit event. The only 
principal exposure that the investor has is to the issuer of the note. 
 
Synthetic CLO 
 
Similar to a cash flow CLO except that the loans are not moved into an SPV. Instead, the 
credit risk is transferred by the sponsoring bank purchasing credit protection on the 
underlying collateral using a portfolio default swap. 
 
 
 
 
